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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
ing that this is surrender by a contestant in a bona fide contest giving
rise to the estoppel.
States, in their concern to control the marital status of their resi-
dents, are defining areas in which foreign divorce decrees are subject
to collateral attack. Although admission of fraud on the court is effectual
when the facts proving it are present, the main area of collateral attack
will continue to be failure of the foreign court to determine the juris-
dictional question in a bona fide contest. Among the chief reasons for
finding a lack of bona fide contest will be the fact that the defendant
did not have counsel of his own choosing and the fact that waiver of
notice and answer was signed before the filing of the proceedings. Per-
sonal appearance as such does not seem to be of controlling importance
except in so far as when it is present it will serve as strong evidentiary
proof that a bona fide contest was had. In final analysis whether a bona
fide contest was had will have to be determined on a case to case basis.
ROBERT H. BICHLER
Conveyancing: Interpretation of "Subject to Financing" Clauses
in Interim Contracts for Sale of Realty-Walter E. Pire and his
wife Emily signed an offer to purchase the property of the Gerruth
Realty Co. for $30,000. Pire tendered a $5,000 down payment in the
form of a promissory note, payable at the time of closing. The offer
was conditioned upon Pire's buying the adjacent property for $40,000,
the closing of the purchase of the two properties being scheduled to
occur simultaneously. Although the Pires "thought they would have no
difficulty in arranging financing," they insisted that this clause be in-
serted:
This offer to purchase is further contingent upon the purchaser
obtaining the proper amount of financing.'
Though no formal application was made, Pire was refused a $75,000
first mortgage loan against the two properties from the Second National
Bank of Beloit, due to the bank's policy of not loaning any individual
over $100,000 or more than 66% per cent of the value of the security.'
Gerruth and the owner of the adjacent property, Putterman, then of-
fered to finance Pire to the extent of $45,000. This proposal was re-
fused as being inadequate.
The trial court held the "subject to financing" clause to be a con-
dition precedent; found that Pire attempted in good faith to fulfill it;
and dismissed a suit on the earnest money note. In affirming, the
Supreme Court held the whole contract void for indefiniteness, and
1 Gerruth Realty Co. v. Pire 17 Wis. 2d 89, 115 N.W. 2d 557 (1962).
2 Presumably, Pike had previously borrowed at least $25,000.
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thereby failed to reach the question of good faith. Gerruth Realty Co.
v. Pire.
The problem presented is whether there is sufficient evidence
upon which this court can ascertain the intention of the parties,
i.e., whether there was a meeting of the minds, even objectively,
concerning the meaning of this clause.3
The general rule governing contracts deficient or ambiguous in some
important detail is that whenever there is a possibility of ascertaining
the meaning of the parties by inference, implication, or construction,
with a reasonable degree of certitude, the courts will do so rather than
let the whole contract fall for indefiniteness.4 The distinguishing feature
of the principal case appears to be the total dearth of evidence con-
cerning any details of the buyer's proposed financing. Several possi-
bilities were explored by the court, and each was found wanting. To
the appellant-vendor's contention that the parties intended to limit the
amount and terms of financing anticipated to such amount and terms as
the usual lending practices of the community would sustain, the court
replied:
We cannot find in the evidence any indication upon which even
a reasonable inference can be drawn that the parties contracted
knowingly and in the light of any current practices in the com-
munity of Beloit with respect to financing of similar transactions,
To the respondent-vendee's contention that the contract limited the
purchaser only to such amount and terms as he might in good faith
select, the court's rejoinder was somewhat less direct:
[W]e cannot agree that this clause gave the defendants the ex-
clusive or absolute option or privilege to determine the proper
amount of financing, without holding the contract illusory. [Em-
phasis supplied] .6
Thus it is apparent that, to the court's mind, the simple standard of
"good faith' cannot supply the most obvious specification of a subject
to financing clause-that of the amount to be borrowed. This determina-
tion appears to proceed largely from a presupposition that a "good
faith" determination of the amount is practically an option without
limitation. "[A]ny interpretation which allows one party to a contract
to determine without limitation and in a subjective manner the mean-
ing of an ambiguous term, comes dangerously close to an illusory or
aleatory contract, if it does not in fact reach it.
'7
3 Supra note 1.
4 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTs, (rev. ed., 1936), §37, p. 100; George v. Oswald, 273
Wis. 380, 78 N.W. 2d 763 (1956); Kelley v. Ellis, 272 Wis. 333, 75 N.W. 2d
569 (1956) ; Taylor v. Bricker, 262 Wis. 377, 55 N.W. 2d 404 (1952) ; Inglis
v. Fohey, 136 Wis. 28, 116 N.W. 857 (1908) ; 56 A.L.R. 2d 1267.
5 Supra note 1.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
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Aiken, "Subject to Financing" Clauses in Interiin Contracts for Sale
of Realty,8 cited by the court, suggests an option theory under which
subject to financing clauses wanting in material detail may escape the
challenge of fatal indefiniteness. By this theory, such clauses would
be construed to empower the purchaser to select in good faith such
financing as would meet his reasonable requirements.9 The theory finds
its most direct decisional support in Reese v. Walker,10 in which the
Ohio court was required to interpret the clause, "contingent upon secur-
ing necessary financing." The court construed the clause as giving to
the buyer the broad power of determining in good faith what was "nec-
essary financing." The buyer had made several efforts to secure financ-
ing (on his own terms) but failed. He sued for his down payment and
recovered. The court ruled that the sellers, having signed a contract
without specifying what financing was "necessary financing," were in
no position to complain." The trial court in the Gerruth case adopted
the entire reasoning process of Reese v. Walker. But the Supreme
Court stated:
In our view the good faith issue arises only after the determina-
tion of the meaning of the ambiguous phrase. 2
In Kovarik v. Vesely, a contract which contained no details of a
financing contingency, other than the amount to be borrowed and a
prospective source of loan, was not held void for uncertainty, but was
held to create a "discretion" in favor of the purchaser to select the miss-
ing terms. In Gerruth, the court distinguished Kovarik v. Vesely' 3 sim-
ply on the ground that in the latter the amount was specifically stated;
without, apparently, considering the essential interdependence of all of
the specifications of commercial financing. To illustrate: $20,000 of
financing may be procurable at 6% interest, or on a 10-year amortiza-
tion; but not more than $16,000 at 5Y _%, or on a 2 0-year amortization.
s Aiken, "Subject to Financing" Clauses In Interim Contracts For Sale of
Realty, 43 MARQ. L. REv. 265 (1960).
9 Professor Aiken's option theory is based on a concurring opinion of Owen,
J. in Kenner v. Edwards R. & F. Co., 204 Wis. 575, 236 N.W. 597 (1931). The
Justice stated that the buyer empowered the seller to negotiate a $30,000
mortgage for him "without any limitation as to the rate of interest it should
bear or the length of time it should run." He goes on to say that the business
wisdom of the buyer may be questioned, but not his right to invest the seller
with such power. Professor Aiken reverses the position of buyer and seller
and asks why the seller cannot place the same power in the hands of the
buyer; "the party in whom is rested the power to determine the unstated
details of the financing could be said to have an option to fix those details
to suit his preference."
10 Reese v. Walker, 151 N.E. 2d 605 (Munic. Ct. Cincinnati, Ohio 1948).
11 Ibid at p. 606.
12 Supra note 1.
"3Kovarik v. Vesely, 3 Wis. 2d 573, 89 N.W. 2d 279 (1958). Although in
Kovarik the issue did not turn on the definiteness of the contract but on
whether or not the stated source of the buyer's financing was an "essential"
part of the condition.
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If the borrower is unable or unwilling to undertake a 2% "origination"
charge, or a 1% prepayment penalty, the amount of financing procur-
able may be similarly reduced. Thus, the first question is whether the
inherent "definiteness" of the statement of contingency is materially
improved, simply by a recitation of the amount to be borrowed. In
short, will it not be necessary to reach the good faith question "to de-
termine the meaning of the ambiguous phrase" even though it fixes the
basic loan amount, if, like Kovarik, it omits other essential details?
Regardless of the force of these considerations, it will be readily
conceded that where circumstances permit, the safe legal course is to
spell out each of the criteria of acceptability of financing. But is this
solution generally possible or practical? In most instances, the details
of financing are inherently ambiguous and tentative when the condi-
tional contract is executed, because neither the buyer, seller, nor pro-
spective third party lender has any definite idea as to what the ultimate
financing terms will (or can) be. This is the precise reason for inserting
a subject to financing clause. To the extent that detail is specifically
stated it ordinarily amounts to no more than a general stipulation of the
bounds of "reasonable diligence," or "reasonable acceptability," or
"good faith" effort toward determining a future fact.
Thus the court is faced with the dilemma of either strictly interpret-
ing such contracts (and therefore often holding them void, as did the
principal case), or allowing the buyer a broad discretion in his selection
of terms, and running the risk that such discretion may, in certain cases,
be almost unlimited. From the decision of the principal case, it would
not appear that any broadly-applicable choice has been made between
the alternatives. The dilemma remains largely unresolved. It would
now appear that only a total absence of specification of detail, either in
the contract or in the surrounding circumstances, produces no contract.
PETER S. BALISTRERI
International Law: Effect Given by the United States Courts to
Expropriation Decrees of Foreign Governments when in Violation
of International Law-One of the defendants contracted to buy
sugar from a subsidiary of an American-owned Cuban corporation,
the latter to supply the cargo on vessels in Cuba, payment in New York
on delivery. On the same day the sugar was to be loaded on board, a
decree was issued by the Cuban government, nationalizing a number
of Cuban corporations, including the vendor's parent corporation, it
being among those corporations designated by the decree as being con-
trolled by physical or corporate persons of the United States. The
decree was based on defensive measures against alleged aggressive acts
of the United States' government which reduced the Cuban sugar quota
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